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REFLECTIONS ON AIR CAPTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ACTIVE INTERVENTION IN THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
An Editorial Comment
When global climate change came onto domestic and international policy agendas
in the late 1980s, only two types of response were initially considered: reducing
emissions by improving efficiencies or switching to lower or non-carbon energy
sources; and adapting to the anticipated changes. Since that time the agenda of
potential responses has been progressively expanded, principally by adding various
ways to intervene in the global carbon cycle or the climate to break the connection
between emissions of greenhouse gases and the resultant climate changes.1 Three
types of these “intervening” responses are now, to varying degrees, present in policy
debate: biological sequestration of carbon in forests or soils (Schlamadinger and
Marland, 2000); point-source carbon capture from fossil fuels or combustion gases,
followed by sequestration in stable reservoirs (Parson and Keith, 1997); and various
forms of albedo modification or other direct manipulation of the climate system,
collectively called geoengineering (Keith, 2000).
In this issue of Climatic Change, Keith, Ha-Duong, and Stolaroff (2006) propose
that one additional intervening option should be considered: capturing CO2 directly
from the atmosphere, then sequestering it in the same reservoirs as would be used
for carbon captured from point sources. They argue that air capture, like a conven-
tional backstop energy technology, can provide an essentially unlimited quantity of
mitigation at constant, high marginal cost. But because air capture would be com-
pletely uncoupled from the energy system, it would have two key advantages over
any prior mitigation technology. First, air capture would take place in free-standing
dedicated plants, and so would offer complete flexibility in siting, timing, and scale.
Second, air capture would not be bound to any particular emissions stream, and so
could be conducted at large enough scale to make any enterprise, nation, or human
civilization as a whole, a net remover of carbon from atmosphere, rather than a
contributor to it.
1. The Benefits of Air Capture in a Dynamically Optimal Climate Response
Assuming cost trends that make air capture competitive with conventional mitiga-
tion by late this century, the authors examine its significance using a dynamically
optimizing integrated-assessment model. This analysis yields two important re-
sults. First, rather than atmospheric CO2 concentration reaching some elevated
level at which it then stabilizes, optimal concentration time-paths reach some max-
imum value, then decline. This behavior arises from two characteristics of the
cost and benefit functions assumed in the model, which are plausible although
Climatic Change (2006)
DOI: 10.1007/s10584-005-9032-z c© Springer 2006
E. A. PARSON
by no means assured. First, mitigation costs decline with time, for reasons that
have been familiar since Wigley et al. (1996) – mainly autonomous technological
change and adjustment-rate costs – as well as the more questionable assumption
in this analysis that baseline emissions stop growing in 2100. Second, climate
damages are scaled to wealth, so the benefit of reducing concentration grows ex-
ponentially over time with the world economy. The interaction of these two factors
gives an optimal concentration time-path that peaks then declines – a qualitative
result that would apply whenever damages grow fast enough relative to mitiga-
tion costs. We would expect this to be the case, for example, if damages increase
faster due to world population and economic growth than they decrease due to
adaptation.
The authors find this result even with only a conventional backstop technology,
but adding air capture to their analysis strengthens the effect: with air capture,
optimal concentration declines rapidly through the 22nd and 23rd centuries. The
reason for this difference is that conventional mitigation cannot reduce emissions
below zero, so the rate of concentration decrease is limited to the natural rate of CO2
removal. Air capture has no such limit, however, so negative net human emissions
can be as large, and concentrations fall as fast, as installed air-capture capacity
can remove it. In the authors’ analysis, optimal concentration converges to the pre-
industrial level because this is where they fix the zero-point of climate damages:
choosing a different zero-point, or allowing this point to rise through adaptation,
would instead yield a return to a higher ultimate concentration.
Their second main result follows from the first. Because air capture enables
faster future reductions in atmospheric CO2 concentration in the future, it increases
the reversibility of current emissions. Although significant irreversibilities remain,
this effect reduces the value of early mitigation as a precaution against the risk
that future climate damages will be large. Consequently, the prospect of future air
capture reduces optimal near-term mitigation and total mitigation costs along the
optimal path.
2. How Would It Work? Technological Options in Political Context
The authors’ results describe changes that introducing the option of air capture
makes to the optimal response to climate change. But introducing potentially at-
tractive new options like air capture can influence the policy debate – and the
decisions that emerge from it – in multiple ways, changing not just the responses
to climate change that are optimal, but also the responses that are likely.
I consider these changes in likely responses, by examining the political economy
of air capture. This requires moving outside the authors’ dynamic optimization
framework to consider the context in which responses to climate change will be
argued, chosen, and implemented. From this perspective, pursuing air capture would
be likely to have far-reaching effects on the politics of the aggregate response to
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climate change, and its likely effectiveness. These effects strongly distinguish air
capture from both conventional mitigation and point-source carbon capture and
sequestration.
Four potential effects are evident. One of these is an advantage: air capture
can simplify the political problem of achieving mitigation by reducing the need for
international cooperation. The other three effects are potential problems introduced
or revealed by pursuing air capture, each pertaining to a different aspect of the
response to climate change: the first concerns the effect of the prospect of air
capture on near-term decision-making; the second questions whether a large future
air-capture program can be as cheap and sustainable as the authors assume; and
the third concerns potential harmful consequences if air capture is deployed at
large scale. Although I refer only to air capture throughout, other geoengineering
responses would face similar issues, with some variation arising principally from
cost differences. I consider the four issues in turn.
Air capture has one important advantage in addition to those that the authors
identify. Greenhouse-gas mitigation is a hard political problem in substantial part
because of the degree of international cooperation needed to achieve it. Air cap-
ture could greatly simplify the problem by reducing the need for cooperation. Air
capture would enable any nation to achieve a secure reduction in atmospheric CO2,
independent of what others do. Nations dissatisfied with worldwide progress in mit-
igation could capture and sequester more CO2 than they emit, offsetting emissions
increases of less committed nations. The authors’ scenarios (their Figure 4) show
air capture reducing atmospheric CO2 concentration by 1 to 2 ppm per year for 150
to 200 years. Using their figures, a program to reduce atmospheric concentration by
1 ppm per year would require about 28,000 cooling-tower structures, covering total
land area of about 54,000 Km2 (about half the area of Ohio, although the structures
would be widely spaced so most of this land would remain available for other uses).
With the authors’ assumption that air capture costs decline to ∼$150/tC late this
century, this program would cost roughly $300 Billion/year, perhaps one-third of
one per cent of United States GDP in the year 21002 – an expenditure clearly within
the fiscal capacity of the United States or some other large, rich nation. By 2100,
it is even conceivable that such an effort might be within the capability of some
coalition of large non-state actors.
The introduction of air capture is also likely to pose significant new chal-
lenges to successful management of global climate change. The first of these is
that the prospect of future air capture introduces moral hazard into near-term mit-
igation decisions, encouraging more delay than is optimal and promoting exces-
sive reliance on air capture or similar measures being successfully implemented
in the future. Air capture expands the set of potentially attractive response op-
tions that are most likely to be relevant several decades in the future, or later. In
a dynamic optimization framework, improving future options usually reduces the
desirability of near-term mitigation efforts. In the authors’ analysis, introducing
air capture produces a modest, incremental reduction in the optimal amount of
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near-term mitigation, coupled with a larger increase in later reductions through air
capture.
But while the reduction in near-term mitigation implied by the authors’ analysis
may be small, the political process by which response decisions are debated and
adopted is unlikely to respond in such a nuanced way. Analyses identifying better
response options in the future reduce the political pressure for near-term efforts,
by providing well-founded supporting arguments for those who oppose near-term
efforts to any degree and for any reason. Consequently, focusing on the large gains
available from promising but relatively distant technologies can starve attractive
near-term options of policy attention and resources. Rather than generating an
incremental reallocation of earlier to later effort in a mitigation plan that was optimal
given prior information, introducing air capture may simply increase the likelihood
that no real mitigation is done for several decades – a result that is not optimal in
the authors’ analysis or, likely, in reality.
This concern is not just hypothetical. Since implementing even attractive near-
term responses requires contentious political choices that distribute real costs, shift-
ing the debate to attractive distant technological solutions is a tactic policy actors
sometimes use to intentionally distract the debate from near-term choices. One
prominent example is the recent focus in US policy on large-scale transformations
of automobile technology such as hydrogen-powered fuel cells. While these options
appear promising to develop for large-scale use in perhaps a few decades, they have
in the meantime distracted from the substantial gains in fuel economy and reduc-
tions in greenhouse-gas emissions available from present technology (Keith and
Farrell, 2003).
To the extent that focusing on attractive distant options like air capture causes
us to reduce or delay near-term efforts – whether to a degree that some analysis
suggests is optimal, or more – we make a commitment to relying on those future
options working. This means not just that their performance and cost turn out about
as good as presently projected, but also that future political and economic conditions
are such that they are feasible and are judged acceptable for large-scale use, and
that competent actors are present with the resources, authority, and incentives to
deploy them. The less we do in the near term, the more we rely on the realization
of all these benign future conditions – technological, economic, and political – that
will enable more to be done, cheaper, later.
Is this a prudent gamble? The second challenge raised by air capture sug-
gests that it might not be, because a future air capture program may be less
sustainable than the authors’ analysis requires it to be. As a consequence of
how air capture would probably be funded and implemented, it may have
less effective incentives for cost-cutting and innovation than either conven-
tional mitigation or point-source carbon capture, and would be highly vulnerable
to changing political and economic conditions – making reliance on such
a future program as the basis for reducing near-term mitigation efforts even
riskier.
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Conventional mitigation and point-source carbon capture gain their advantages
over air capture from the fact that these approaches will mainly be implemented
by private businesses, through investment and R&D decisions they take to pur-
sue lower-carbon energy technologies. Businesses will make these decisions in
response to incentives imposed by public policy. If the policies are sensibly de-
signed and implemented – e.g., if they target emissions directly, allow flexibil-
ity in how firms meet their obligations, and include adequate monitoring and
enforcement – they will provide incentives not just to improve environmental
performance as required, but also to reduce costs and to pursue innovations to
do it better and cheaper. Although greenhouse-gas mitigation policies would be
unprecedented in their scale and their effect on the economy, several decades
of experience with environmental regulation on other issues provide good guid-
ance on how to design policies to put these incentives in place. If we follow this
guidance, then policies that require mitigation by private firms are likely to moti-
vate substantial cost reductions once they are enacted, in both the near and long
term.
Moreover, such policies tend to persist once enacted, even under changing po-
litical and economic conditions. Enacting environmental policies always meets
resistance: even well designed policies impose duties and costs on private actors,
who generally prefer not to be so coerced. But for certain kinds of environmental
policies, once the policies are enacted and firms have begun complying, there is
little political pressure to weaken or reverse the policies. This asymmetry in the
politics of environmental regulation – stiff resistance to enacting or tightening regu-
lations, but little pressure to reverse them once enacted – arises from several factors.
The most important is that when improvements in environmental performance are
achieved through investments in innovations and cleaner technology, these costs are
largely sunk. As investments and technology adjust around the new requirements
and incentives for better environmental performance, these advances shape a new
status quo – defined both in terms of the current state of technology from which
further advances are pursued, and in terms of the shared perceptions and expec-
tations of how responsible firms behave. Even firms that resisted new regulations,
once they have improved their performance to meet the new obligations, can claim
credit – reasonably – for helping to solve the problem.
These adjustment processes are substantially irreversible. Consequently, firms
that have gone through them typically have little or no interest in the regulations
being subsequently relaxed, even if only their narrowest commercial interests are
considered. For example, it is most unlikely that any established firm could now
benefit from re-introducing CFCs or weakening present emission controls on au-
tomobiles, given all the adjustments firms and markets have made to the present
stringent requirements. Even in cases where a firm could benefit from weakening
an environmental regulation, the cost to their reputation of openly advocating such
weakening, and the response of competitors who are more strongly committed to
environmental performance and who fear being undercut, make the prospects for a
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successful reversal weak. In view of all these factors, environmental policies that
achieve their effect by shifting private-sector investment and technology decisions
tend to be highly resistant to attempts to weaken or reverse them.3
A large-scale air capture program, by contrast, would be less likely to benefit ei-
ther from incentives for continued cost reduction and innovation, or from resistance
to reversal. While conventional mitigation will be integrated into the technology
and capital stock of private firms, air capture will be done in costly, dedicated “envi-
ronmental factories” whose only output is an environmental benefit, and which are
unconnected to the production of any private-market goods or services. This dis-
connection from private markets is another aspect of the decoupling of air capture
from the energy system that Keith et al. identify. But while they correctly note that
this decoupling will give air capture advantages of flexibility in implementation, it
will also have large unfavorable implications for its cost and sustainability.
A major air-capture program would be the biggest public-works project the world
has ever seen. Its funding would in all likelihood come from public treasuries,4 while
its implementation would be through either direct government provision or con-
tracting from private firms. If contracted from private firms, the relationship would
be similar to military procurement of products for which no precise counterpart is
sold in the private economy, and would likely face similar difficulties in sustaining
strong incentives for performance and cost reduction. While well designed bidding
processes, contract terms, and monitoring provisions can help, it is unlikely that any
procurement process, or direct government provision, can generate these incentives
as effectively as private markets do. With substantially weaker incentives for cost
reduction, air capture would be less likely than conventional mitigation to benefit
from the large cost declines over time that the authors assume.
Moreover, a successful air capture program must be sustained over periods that
are extraordinarily long in political and economic terms: in the authors’ analysis,
the optimal climate response requires an air-capture program removing 1–2 ppm
per year to operate continuously for 150–200 years. The large public expenditures
such a program would require will always be politically vulnerable, no matter
who builds and operates the facilities. Air-capture plants will provide only a pure
global public-good, which will accrue over periods of several decades or longer.
No matter how valuable these benefits are, there is unlikely to be any domestic
constituency with a sustained material interest in supporting the associated large
public expenditures – except the firms receiving the contracts, who are unlikely to
be a serious political force. Consequently, funding for air capture will probably be
a persistent target of budget-cutters whenever fiscal conditions are tight or public
priorities shift. In view of this vulnerability, it may be quite imprudent to base
present policies on the assumption that a large, costly future air-capture program
can be established several decades hence and reliably sustained for 150 years or
more.
These arguments for the vulnerability of air capture and its potential costliness,
however, are based on the assumption that it is directly government funded. Might
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not some other way of organizing its provision and funding hold more promise
of success? Two alternative forms of organization clearly merit consideration, al-
though a preliminary examination suggests that both would face similar obstacles.
One alternative would treat air capture facilities in the same manner as some ju-
risdictions treat highways, bridges, and other public infrastructure projects: entrust
them to an independent public authority, funded either through a one-time cap-
italization or a dedicated revenue source such as a toll. Such an authority, with
its specialized expertise and its insulation from larger-scale politics, would have
significant advantages over regular government agencies in overseeing contractors
and giving them sustained incentives for cost reduction and innovation. It would
be unlikely, however, to significantly reduce the future political vulnerability of an
air capture program, even once the program is established. The essential difficulty
is that air capture, unlike highway or bridge authorities, does not provide a good
or service of private value to identified users. Consequently, there is no natural
way to connect its operations to a dedicated revenue source, like a toll, that can be
securely insulated from general public budget politics. The closest approximation
would be to earmark revenues from a relevant tax, such as one on greenhouse-gas
emissions, but this could not attain the same level of security. Even more seriously,
an air capture authority would be unlikely to gather a constituency, like highway
users, with a strong material interest in its continued operations. Consequently, it
will always be possible – and attractive to many – to save money by shutting down
air capture operations and reclaiming the operating costs for other public priorities.
A second alternative would seek to privatize air capture. This would require in-
tegrating air capture into some larger-scale regulatory scheme, under which private
emitters bear an obligation to reduce emissions that they may choose to meet either
through air capture or conventional mitigation. This approach could promote effi-
cient trading off of contemporaneous mitigation opportunities, and would provide
incentives for cost reduction: we would expect to see air capture operating if and
when its costs decline enough, and conventional mitigation proceeds far enough,
that air capture is competitive with the remaining mitigation opportunities. This
possibility would be allowed by any well designed system of tradable emission
permits that counts all emissions and secure sequestration equivalently. No explicit
policy supporting air capture would be needed, beyond ensuring that the removals
achieved by air capture are fairly credited.
But such trading of future air capture against concurrent mitigation would not
capture the largest benefit of air capture that the authors identify. They project
that large-scale deployment of air capture will come late this century and beyond,
when it will exceed concurrent emissions and so drive atmospheric concentrations
rapidly downward. The major benefits of air capture consequently come not from
displacing more costly concurrent mitigation, but from displacing mitigation that
would otherwise have been conducted decades earlier. Allowing such displacement
to occur within a private tradable-permit system would require creating multi-
decade emissions budgets that let emitters avoid near-term obligations by promising
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reductions decades in the future. In view of all the ways such promises could be
broken – e.g., bankruptcy – it is most unlikely that such a system could be made
acceptably secure.
In sum, these two alternative models for organizing air capture could strengthen
incentives for cost reduction, but would not overcome the insecurity of sustained
future performance. The first alternative would be as vulnerable as direct public
provision to shifting policy priorities and budgetary conditions; the second would
simply replace that insecurity of public performance by an insecurity of private
performance at least as severe. Neither alternative would appear to significantly
reduce the risks of basing current decisions on the assumption of a cheap, large-
scale future air capture program sustained for more than a century.
The third concern with air capture pertains to the consequences for international
politics if a large-scale air capture program is successfully implemented. A large-
scale air capture program would represent a substantial increase in the explicit,
active exercise of human control over the global atmosphere, allowing for the
first time the possibility of intentionally either increasing or decreasing radiative
forcing. This expansion of the domain of environmental properties for which human
activities are explicitly responsible would, among other changes, create substantial
new possibilities for conflict over how we should use this new power: in what
direction, how far, and how fast should we steer atmospheric CO2 concentration?
In their analysis, the authors assume that the optimal CO2 concentration for
human welfare is the pre-industrial level of 280 ppm, while acknowledging that
adaptation to higher concentrations during the 21st century could raise the ideal
level. Opponents of near-term mitigation are already questioning this assumption,
however, arguing – perhaps insincerely, but with some foundation – that there is
no reason to assume the global climate of two centuries ago is necessarily ideal for
human welfare, even without considering potential adaptation to future changes.
The issue is complex, but the obvious preference of many temperate and high-
latitude citizens for warmer climates provides some evidence that optimal CO2
concentration may be somewhat higher than the pre-industrial level.
Moreover, given large disparities among world regions in projected climate im-
pacts, adaptation potential, and resources – not to mention culture and preferences
– it is likely that citizens of different regions, or even different groups within a
region, will disagree over the preferred level. As advancing knowledge and the ex-
perience of continuing climate change make the consequences for specific groups
and regions of alternative CO2 concentrations clearer, such disagreement could
rise to the level of sharp inter-regional conflict. Such conflicts have had at most
a marginal presence in climate-policy debates thus far, but each increase in ex-
plicit human ability to manipulate the climate is likely to make them more central
and more acute – particularly if the actions in question lie within the capability
of a single nation acting unilaterally. In a worst-case scenario, states might not
only pursue contrary policies to move the global climate in their preferred direc-
tion, but might begin to interpret any destructive weather or climate extreme they
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experience as the responsibility, perhaps even the intention, of some other state –
a situation frighteningly reminiscent of early cold-war worries about intentional
weather modification as an act of war (NRC, 1966).
3. Conclusions
In theory, having more options to choose from always makes you better off: if it
is advantageous to use a newly identified option, you can benefit; if not, you can
do what you would have done otherwise and be no worse off. But in public policy
making – perhaps especially for issues with such far-reaching implications and
long time horizons as climate change – the set of options considered influences the
decision process in more complex ways, with implications for the tradeoff between
early and delayed action, the distribution of costs and benefits, and the prospects
for deadlock and conflict.
The growing prominence in the climate-change debate of technically attractive
but temporally distant prospects like air capture may hinder development of an
effective climate-change response in three ways: legitimating the current deadlock
over mitigation by providing good reasons that delaying action is preferable, even if
these apply only within a highly idealized decision-making framework; misleading
early decision-making by promising more for future technical prospects than they
can likely deliver in practice; and sharpening the potential for international conflict
over climate change.
These risks do not inhere in the technical options themselves: as Keith et al. ar-
gue, air capture deployed optimally in an integrated response to climate change
brings clear benefits. Rather, the challenges arise from how these options in-
teract with likely biases, conflicts, and other pathologies of choice in a policy
setting. The essential problem is that while introducing these options improves
the optimal response, it may also move the likely response further away from
optimality.
These decision challenges do not, of course, imply that air capture should not be
seriously considered and investigated. In any case, we cannot avoid these decision
challenges by pretending to ignore the technical options that raise them. Capabilities
like air capture and other forms of geoengineering are obvious upon systematic
examination of the climate-change issue, and so will remain available for actors to
promote in the policy debate. Indeed, because the increasing identification of such
responses is a consequence of the continued expansion of human activities and
capabilities to influence planetary-scale processes – the same driving forces that
are generating the increase in number, severity, and complexity of our planetary-
scale environmental burdens – such options are only likely to grow more numerous
and more salient, and to gather more support.
Whether air capture – or any other promising form of active intervention in
planetary-scale processes – should be a significant part of our response to climate
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change is not a question that can be sensibly approached piecemeal, one tech-
nology at a time. Rather, the steady growth of both our capabilities and our en-
vironmental burdens, and the shrinking maneuvering room we have to make de-
cisions to limit climate change, will increasingly compel us to face more sys-
tematic questions about how to respond than we have so far. Can we continue
to rely on specific technical correctives for each problem as it arises – whether
these are changes in production processes to further reduce environmental bur-
dens per unit of output, or direct environmental interventions to offset those bur-
dens like air capture? Alternatively, can we continue to rely on narrowly drawn
policies to motivate reductions in whatever specific forms of production and con-
sumption pose the clearest immediate risks? Or must we somehow find a way to
address the larger-scale question of limiting the aggregate scale of human pop-
ulation and economic activity, and seek to identify some means to achieve this
that is compatible with humane, democratic states that value individual liberty?
Each new proposal for a seemingly attractive geoengineering response to climate
change illustrates how essential it is to address these larger-scale questions, but
after nearly twenty years of policy discussions about climate change it appears that
our decision-making processes and institutions remain gravely inadequate for this
task.
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Notes
1Although several types of intervening option were discussed in scientific reports as early as
the 1960s, these essentially disappeared from consideration as climate change began to attract
policy attention in the late 1980s. This category of responses was first explicitly distinguished
from emissions reduction and adaptation by Schelling (1983), who called them “countervailing
modifications.”
2 Based on 1 ppm CO2=2.16 GtC; costs occur in some future year but are measured in 2005
dollars; United States average annual real GDP Growth through 2100 is 2%; reduction of 1 ppm per
year is measured from the concentration trend that would have occurred given world net anthropogenic
emissions other than the specified air capture program.
3 Note that this argument does not apply to all environmental policies. Policies that limit land
development or resource exploitation activities, or that require costly operational changes that are
not embedded in new capital or technology, impose continuing operating costs that can be avoided
anytime by weakening the policies. As a result, such policies more often face attempts to weaken or
reverse them, like recent attacks on the Endangered Species Act and on regulations for hydrocarbon
exploration and development.
4 Voluntary provision would also be possible, as suggested above, but the scale of this funding
source would probably be much more limited.
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